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ABSTRACT MONTEREY CA tf3*43-5l01
We have developed a decision support model to evaluate potential alternatives
for improving MK 16 Mine Countermeasure (MCM) system mission readiness.
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) resource managers are expected to maximize
readiness in the face of increasing operational commitments and declining budgets.
In order to remain effective in this environment, managers must take a more
aggressive approach toward cost efficiency. This can be accomplished by reducing
the potential variability associated with resource allocation decisions. We find we can
reduce uncertainty through the use of decision support models and the application of
sensitivity analysis. We will apply our model to reduce the uncertainty associated
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The environment in which Navy resource managers operate is constantly
changing. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) resource managers are expected to
maximize readiness in the face of increasing operational commitments and declining
budgets. Today's managers are expected to do more with less and there is no margin
for error regarding wasteful resource allocation decisions. In order to avoid potential
risk and waste, managers must be able to reduce the uncertainty associated with
alternative courses of action. A principal means of reducing this uncertainty is
through the use of a decision support model.
The primary goal of this thesis is to reduce the uncertainty associated with the
MK 16 MCM system readiness improvements, by providing the resource manager
with a decision support model for evaluating the alternatives. The two alternatives
analyzed in this thesis are:
• Improve the reliability of the MK 16
• Increase the number of spare MK 16s available to the operational
detachment.
From this point on the MK 16 MOD Underwater Breathing Apparatus
(UBA) will be referred to as the MK 1 6 and the term MK 1 6 mine countermeasure
(MCM) system will refer to the standard issue of four MK 1 6s as a single unit.
There are three objectives for this research:
• Conduct a MK 16 reliability and operational availability assessment,
• Analyze the effects ofMK 16 reliability improvements or the addition
of spares MK 16s on MK 16 MCM system mission readiness,
• Combine these calculations with cost data to develop a decision support
model which will assist in evaluating the two alternatives.
There are two points ofview that must be considered during the allocation of
resources. The operational commander is primarily concerned with reliability and
mission readiness, while the resource manager is concerned with the cost associated
with meeting the desired goals. The decision support model developed in this
research is only one part of the decision making process.
Figure 1.1. Decision Making Process
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The decision making process, illustrated in Figure 1 .1, is a triad of elements.
It includes managerial judgement, available data & information, and the application
of a technique for evaluating the alternatives (i.e., a decision support model), See
Keen (1979).
In the past, many critical decisions related to resource allocation were based
solely on experience and intuition, with little regard for decision support models.
Today's emphasis on eliminating waste, while attempting to optimize operational
performance, requires resource managers to utilize all available tools in an effort to
improve efficiency.
Decision support models can be qualitative or quantitative in nature, but in
every case it provides potential for improving the decision makers ability to pick the
optimal solution. There are several reasons why a decision support model should be
developed. Some include:
• Complexity of the decision (too many variables)
• Importance and consequences related to the decisions (limited funding)
• A flexibility requirement (constantly changing environment)
• Short term experience base (length of personnel assignments).
This research is intended to emphasize the advantages of a decision support
model by applying it to the two alternatives to improving mission readiness. The
fundamental value of the model is its ability to assist in evaluating alternatives by
conducting what-if-scenarios. What must be emphasized is that this analysis is only
a quantitative tool to assist in the evaluation of the two alternatives. Selection of the
optimal solution also requires qualitative techniques and managerial judgement. Like
any tool available to the decision maker, the analysis is limited in its usefulness by the
abilities and insight of that individual.
Prior to discussing the results of the analysis, a few terms and definitions are
vital to the reader's understanding of the material presented in this thesis. All
definitions and formulas are taken from Blanchard (1992), and are applied directly to
the MK 16 for ease of the reader's interpretation.
A. LOGISTIC CONCEPTS
1. Logistic Support is viewed as the composite of all considerations
necessary to assure the effective and economical support of the MK 16
throughout its life cycle.
2. Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is the average time between MK
16 corrective maintenance actions.
3. Mean Active Maintenance Time (M) is the average maintenance time,
also is a function of both the MK 16 preventive (scheduled) and
corrective (unscheduled) maintenance requirements.
4. Mean Corrective Maintenance Time (Met) is the average time to
conduct MK 1 6 corrective maintenance.
5. Mean Preventive Maintenance Time (Mpt) is the average time to
conduct MK 16 preventive maintenance.
Maintenance Down Time (MDT) is the total time that the MK 16 is not
in condition to perform its mission (the time it tales to repair and restore
the apparatus to full operational status). MDT includes mean active
maintenance time (M), logistical delay time (LDT), and administrative
delay time (ADT).
Maintenance includes all the actions necessary to retain or restore the
MK 16 to serviceable conditions. The two categories include correc-
tive (unscheduled) and preventive (schedule) maintenance.
a. Corrective (unscheduled maintenance) includes all unscheduled
actions performed, as a result of system failure, to restore the
MK 16 to operational condition. For the purposes of the
analysis corrective maintenance includes failure identification,
localization, isolation, disassembly, removal, and replacement,
reassembly, checkout, and condition verification. Figure 1.2
illustrates the steps involved in the MK 16 corrective main-
tenance cycle.
b. Preventive (scheduled maintenance) includes all scheduled
actions performed to retain the MK 16 to operational condition.
Preventive maintenance includes accomplishment of the
periodic inspection, condition monitoring, and calibration.
Maintenance Levels pertain to the division of functions and task for
each area where maintenance is performed. The maintenance levels
associated with the MK 16 are listed in Table 1.1, they include only





















MK 16 is Operational
Figure 1.2. MK 16 Corrective Maintenance Cycle
Table 1.1. MK 16 Maintenance Levels
Criteria Operational Level Maintenance Depot Level Maintenance
Where Conducted at the Operational
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile
Units
Conducted at the Depot Level
Maintenance Facility in Indian
Head, MD.
Whom By Operational Personnel By Depot Facility Personnel
9. System Effectiveness measures are figures of merit representing the
extent to which the MK 16 is able to perform its intended mission.
a. Availability is the measure of the degree to which aMK 16 is in
the operable condition when called upon at a random point in
time. Availability is a function of operating time (reliability)
and down time.
b. Reliability is defined as the probability that the MK16 will
perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period oftime when
used under specific operating conditions.
10. Sensitivity Analysis is conducted because of the uncertainty inherent
with inadequate data. It is a method for determining how sensitive the
results are to uncertainty in parameters (a component failure rate). The
data provided will be used as a baseline and analyzed to measure the
impact of the uncertainty in the results of the analysis.
B. THESIS STRUCTURE
In Chapter II, we provide a brief background, basic description, and set the
stage for the operational requirements placed on the MK 16. In Chapter III, we use
maintenance and operational data to calculate the reliability function for the MK 16.
In Chapter IV, we develop a model that combines simulated cost data with readiness
improvement alternatives to emphasize the potential benefits of developing a decision
support model. Finally, in Chapter V we formulate our conclusions and make
recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND
As the sophistication of underwater ordnance increases with modern
technology, so does the complexity of countering the mine threat. Modern
underwater mines utilize a combination of electronic sensors to identify and destroy
targets. These sensors are typically designed to detect one of the four signals:
acoustic, magnetic, pressure, and seismic signals which are emitted by potential
targets. When necessary, Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) divers are
required to operate in close proximity of these influence-activated underwater
ordnance, in order to conduct location, identification, destruction, and recovery
operations.
This chapter will review the history, general description and the basic
operational characteristics of the MK 16. It also includes a brief description of the
four subassemblies. Finally, to improve the reader's understanding of the require-
ments placed upon the MK 16, a typical MK 16 deployment scenario is discussed.
A. HISTORY
As recent as 12 years ago, Navy EOD divers were conducting MCM
operations with semi-closed breathing apparatuses that provided marginal magnetic
protection with virtually no acoustic protection from influence-activated underwater
ordnance.
In the early 1970's, the U.S. Navy identified a mission need to provide EOD
divers with a nonmagnetic, acoustically quiet, closed-circuit, mixed gas UBA. Prior
to development of the MK 16, EOD divers used the MK VI which was a semi-closed
circuit UBA that provided borderline magnetic and acoustic (emits bubbles) safety for
the divers. Both the poor acoustic and magnetic characteristics associated with the
MK VI were detectable by modern mine sensors. Other safety concerns regarding the
MK VI included breathing resistance and decompression profiles. In 1979, logistic
support for the MK VI was terminated and marginal mission capability was
maintained through cannibalization of fleet assets, See Walsh (1989).
B. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The following descriptions, drawings and operating information were taken
from the U. S. Navy Diving Manual, Vol. II (1987).
The MK 16 MOD Underwater Breathing Apparatus (UBA) was specifically
developed to provide Navy EOD divers with life support to a maximum depth of 300
feet. The MK 16 is a nonmagnetic, close-circuit, mixed-gas, constant partial pressure
ofoxygen (pp02) underwater breathing apparatus. The MK16 is illustrated in Figures
2.1 and 2.2.
The MK 16 was specifically designed to defeat the acoustic and magnetic
detection capability of modern sensors. Acoustically sound, the MK 16 utilizes a
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Figure 2.2. MK 16 MOD Components
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closed-circuit breathing loop which results in bubble-free operations, except when
ascending. This capability coupled with the nonmagnetic signature characteristic of
the MK 16 make it well suited for influence ordnance operations.
The mixed gas capability of the MK 16 facilitates deep diving operations,
while preventing the effects of nitrogen narcosis. Additionally, to prevent the
hazards ofhypoxia (lack ofoxygen) and oxygen toxicity, (oxygen poisoning), the MK
16 was designed to maintain a constant partial pressure of oxygen (pp02), regardless
of depth. Through the use of the electronics subassembly, the oxygen level in the
divers breathing medium is constantly monitored and maintained within narrow limits
of safe operation.
To conserve the gas supply and extend the underwater duration of the MK 16
it is designed to; 1) recirculate the diver's breathing medium for reuse, 2) remove
carbon dioxide from the divers breathing medium, and 3) automatically add oxygen
as necessary to maintain a constant partial pressure of oxygen. Ultimately, the MK
16 combines the operational mobility ofa free swimming diver with depth advantages
of mixed gas and permits complete autonomous diver operations without surface
support.
The complete MK 16 UBA is broken down into four subassemblies: the
electronics subassembly, the pneumatics subassembly, the recirculation subassembly,




Three sensors located under the scrubber assembly monitor the partial pressure
of oxygen and send signals to the electronics module and secondary display. The
electronics module compares the actual pp02 value with set point value, and controls
the oxygen addition valve as necessary to maintain a constant pp02 . The diver is able
to monitor the acceptable (green LED) or unacceptable (red LED) level of pp02
within the breathing loop via the primary display attached to the diver's mask.
2. Pneumatics Subassembly
The pneumatic subassembly is comprised of 1 ) high pressure bottles which
store oxygen and diluent gases, 2) gauges to permit monitoring of the remaining gas
supply, 3) controls and pluming to regulate and deliver oxygen and diluent gases to
the recirculation circuit.
3. Recirculation System Subassembly
The recirculation system consists of a closed loop incorporating inhalation and
exhalation hoses, a mouthpiece or full face mask, a carbon dioxide scrubber, and a
flexible breathing diaphragm. The diver's breathing medium is recirculated to
remove carbon dioxide and permit reuse of the inert gases. The scrubber assembly
is filled with a high efficiency granular carbon dioxide absorbent material which
removes absorbs carbon dioxide from the breathing medium, as it passes through the
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breathing loop. Additionally, the breathing medium is constantly monitored by three
sensors. The sensors provide input to the electronics module which control the
addition of oxygen in order to maintain a constant pp02 .
4. Equipment Case (Hardware) Subassembly
The major components of the MK 16 are housed in a molded reinforced
fiberglass case. The case is a contoured backpack assembly designed for minimum
interference while swimming and is equipped with an integral harness assembly.
External to the housing are components such as the mouthpiece, the pressure
indicators, the hoses, and the primary and secondary displays.
In order for the non-experienced reader to understand the complexities
involved in conducting a diving related Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Operation, the
author discusses a basic MCM MK 16 deployment scenario.
D. MINE COUNTERMEASURE (MCM) MISSION SCENARIOS
For the purpose of this analysis, there are two basic mission scenarios. Each
ofthe two scenarios places different demands on the MK 16 MCM system. The first
of these scenarios is the high intensity MCM mission (i.e., amphibious landing lane
clearance, harbor clearance), where operational requirements are extreme and time is
a critical factor. The second scenario is that of a routine MCM mission (i.e., post
operation mine clearance) where time is not as critical. The logistics support required
15
for either mission differ greatly. What might be acceptable for the routine MCM
mission would most likely be unacceptable for the high intensity mission.
E. PHASES OF A MINE COUNTERMEASURE MISSION
For the sake of simplicity, the author broke the typical MCM mission down




Figure 2.3. Four Phases of an EOD MCM Mission
As can be seen from Figure 2.3, the phases of an EOD MCM mission form a
series network. Each phase ofthe operation must be successful for the entire mission
to be successful. The diving phase is the most demanding phase of the MCM
operation and the MK 16 is the primary component within that phase ofthe operation.
Hence, the reliability of the MK 16 has an immense impact on the probability of
mission success.
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F. THE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL MCM DETACHMENT
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) Mine Counter Measures
(MCM) detachments are deployed to areas involved in mine clearance operations.
The standard issue for an operational Mine Counter Measure (MCM) detachment is
four MK 16s, referred to as the MK 16 MCM system. MCM detachments typically
consist of six personnel, the officer in charge (OIC), a leading chief petty officer
(LCPO), and four additional EOD qualified divers.
During the diving phase ofthe operations, all fourMK 16s are prepared for use
and placed in operation for the duration of the diving phase. Standard operating
procedures are to deploy two MK 16 equipped divers to prosecute the underwater
contact while one MK 16 equipped diver remains in the boat, assigned as the standby
safety diver. The remaining MK 16 is left on the support platform as an operational
spare. Under certain extreme conditions, diving operations can be conducted with
only two operational MK 16s, but for the purpose of this analysis it is assumed that
any time there are less than three operational MK 16s, the diving operation is aborted.
There are several variables that affect average dive profiles (i.e., water
temperature, max depth, bottom condition, etc.) and every dive is different, but based
on the available data, the average dive profile is estimated to be ninety minutes.
Additionally, dives per operation vary widely with each scenario, but for the benefit
of this analysis it will be assumed that the cumulative profile for the average MCM
17
diving operation is five hours. It is clearly understood that there is extensive
variation in these assumptions. These assumptions are based on best available data
and are essential to conducting sensitivity analysis. Several ofthese assumptions are
essential to the interpretation of the analysis and may be restated from time to time
for clarity of understanding.
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III. MK 16 RELIABILITY
The first objective of this research is to conduct a reliability and operational
availability assessment of the MK 16. All formulas and definitions utilized in this
chapter are taken from Blanchard (1992).
The usefulness of any research is directly correlated to the availability of
accurate data and information. The data compiled in this thesis was solicited from all
conus Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Units (EODMU), the Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Technical Division (EODTECHDIV), and the Navy Dive and
Salvage Training Center (NDSTC).
A. MK 16 UNSCHEDULED (CORRECTIVE) MAINTENANCE REQUIRE-
MENTS
The primary source of information relating to system failure and corrective
maintenance requirements was taken from the current MK 16 failure analysis
reporting (FAR) system. This data was collected by the EODTECHDIV for a five-
year period from 1987 to 1991. The FARs were broken down into the four
designated subassemblies in order to facilitate describing individual component
effects on the MK 16's reliability, see Appendix A. The four subassemblies of the
MK 16 are the electronics, pneumatic, recirculation, and hardware subassemblies (see
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U. S. Navy Diving Manual, Vol. II, (1987)). This data provides the basis for
determining the MK 1 6 reliability function.
B. MK 16 SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
The principal source of information relating to preventive maintenance
requirements was the NAVSEA SS600-AH-MMA-010 Maintenance Requirements
(April 1997). Scheduled maintenance requirements were also broken down into the
four subassemblies. A list of those requirements is listed in Appendix B.
C. OPERATIONAL DATA
The following information was either provided or calculated from the
information provided by the above listed sources.
1. Total Number of dives conducted during the five-year period: 9850
Dives
2. Average number of MK16's utilized during the five-year period: 22.1
MK16s
3. Average Dive Profile Per Dive: 90 Minutes
4. Average Administrative Delay Time (ADT): 30 Minutes
5. Average Logistical Delay Time (LDT): 30 Minutes
6. Average Estimated Corrective Maintenance Time (Met): 60 Minutes
From the information provided the following factors were calculated:
7. Average number of Dives per Year: 1970 Dives/Year
20
Total Number of Dives conducted during the 5 Year period
5 Years
8. Average Total Dive Time Per Year: 2955 Hours/Year
(Average Number of Dives per year) X (Average Dive Time)
60 Minutes
9. Mean Preventive Maintenance Time (Mpt): .647 Hours
(Mpt) = Total Scheduled Maintenance Time
Total Number of Schedule Maintenance Actions
10. Mean Active Maintenance (M): .636 Hours
M = &,) (Met,) + (Fptj) (Mptq
(K) + (FpO




Maintenance Down Time (MDT): 1 .636 Hours
MDT = LDT + ADT + M
12. Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
MTBF= 1 = 13.14 Hours
MK 16 Failure Rate (A.)
The failure rate (A) is the rate at which failure occurs in a specific time interval an
is expressed as:
X= Number of Failures
Total Operating Hours
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The failure rate of the complete MK 16 as a system is the sum of the failure
rates of each subassembly within the system and is expressed as:
*^ MK. 16 ~ "• Electronics "• Pneumatic ^ Recirculation ^ Hardware
The failure rate of each subassembly is the sum of the failure rates of the components
within that subassembly.
'*' Electronics "" Primary Electronics '*' Primary Display " Secondary Display
Appendix C illustrates the component/subassembly failure rate relationship.
Table 3.1 lists the subassembly failure rates and their corresponding MTBF. It is
important to note that MTBF is based solely on the effects of unscheduled (correc-
tive) maintenance requirements.
Table 3.1. MK16 Failure Rate
MK 16 Failure Rate (A.)





MK 16 Failure Rate .076074 13.15
From this analysis we can estimate that the MK 16 will fail on average every
13.15 hours of dive operation. This estimate is based on the average 90 minute MK
16 dive profile. From the information listed above, the electrical subassembly is the
primary source of failures, and it accounts for 45% of all MK 16 failures. Information
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in Appendix A identifies that within the electronics subassembly the primary
electronics package poses the greatest degrader to MK 16 reliability. This accounts
for 30% of the failures associated with the electronics subassembly.
D. MK 16 RELIABILITY
Reliability is defined as the probability that the system will perform in a
satisfactory manner for a given period of time when used under specific operating
conditions. This definition stresses the elements of probability, satisfactory
performance, time, and specified operation conditions.
1
.
The first element of the reliability definition, probability, is a quantita-
tive expression representing a percent which signifies the number of
times that an event occurred, divided by the total number of events.
2. The second element of the reliability definition, satisfactory perform-
ance, is defined as the operational condition in which no corrective
maintenance actions were required to restore the MK 16 back to opera-
tional status.
3. The third element, time, is the most important since it represents a
measure against which the degree of the system performance can be
related.
4. The final element ofthe reliability definition, specified operating condi-
tions are the conditions under which the MK 16 was designed to
operate. Once outside these conditions reliability is no longer
measurable.
23
The MK 16 is a series network designed system. This implies that each
internal component must work for the system to perform properly. If one component
fails, then the system fails and the MK 16 cannot perform its assigned mission.
Basically, the reliability of the MK 16 is a function of the reliability of each of the
four subassemblies, which in turn is a function of the reliability of each individual
component within that subassembly. This principle of the MK 16 series system is
illustrated in Figures 3.1.
K- MK 16 ~~ k**- ElectronicsA*^- PneumaticA*^- RecirculationA*^- Hardware/
** Electronics
~~ V^ Primary Electronics/ V-**- Primary Display A-**- Secondary Display/
Figure 3.1. MK 16/Subassembly Relationship
Each component was individually analyzed and used to develop the analysis
for the associated subassembly. Appendix D lists the reliabilities of each
subassembly and the individual components for a ninety minute dive profile.
The MK 16 reliability function, R MK 16(r) is expressed as (one minus the
probability that the system will fail by time (t)). Assuming that time to failure is
exponentially distributed, the reliability of a MK 16 at time (t) can be expressed as:
R(t) = e 'x (,) . The A. represents the overall failure rate of the MK 16. The MK 16
failure rate (X) calculated in Table 3.1 is A.MK16 = .076074. Therefore, the reliability
function that represents the MK 16 is: R MK 16(t) = e -° 76074('\
24
Figure 3.1 illustrates the reliability function of the MK 16 over a range of dive
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Figure 3.1. Reliability of the MK 16 MOD
16 for a five-hour profile is approximately 68%. Otherwise stated there is a 32%
chance that the single MK 16 will fail during a five-hour profile.
E. IMPROVEMENTS IN RELIABILITY
The primary means of improving MK 16 reliability is by reducing the failure
rate. Improvements could be made to individual components or entire subsystems.
The usual methodology is to increase reliability by first improving the components
which represent the primary mission degraders. Based on component failure rate
information provided in Appendix A, the single component responsible for the
greatest number ofMK 16 failures is the primary electronics package.
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Generally speaking, improvements in electrical components typically require
more of an investment than improvements in mechanical components. Due to the
strict nonmagnetic requirements placed on the MK 16, this is not the case. MK 16
electronic components lend themselves to being nonmagnetic (i.e., plastic circuit
boards), while mechanical components require much more research and testing of
available materials.
Finally, it must be reemphasized that reliability is defined as the probability
that the MK16 will perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period of time .
Reliability is not an overall specific stand alone value, it changes as the dive profile
changes. Demonstrated in the reliability function and seen in Figure 3.2, as the diving
profile increases the reliability of the MK 16 for that specific profile decreases. It is
important for the reader to understand this concept in order to comprehend the
calculations for MK 1 6 MCM system readiness derived in the next chapter.
26
IV. DECISION SUPPORT MODEL
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, past decisions related to
resource allocation were based primarily on qualitative techniques (i.e., judgement
and experience). Qualitative skills are inherent to the decision maker, but the
quantitative skills necessary to analyze large or complex problems are often too
complicated for the decision maker to handle without the support of a computer. The
resource manager who also utilizes quantitative analysis techniques will be in a much
better position to compare and evaluate the potential alternatives. For this research
a spreadsheet analysis technique was utilized to depict the reliability, cost, and
readiness relationships associated with the MK 16. The model concentrates solely
on the facts and is intended to provide insight to the resource manager on the cost
benefit relationship.
A. MISSION READINESS
Mission readiness, as defined in this research, is the probability of having less
than two MK 16 failures for a standard issue, or the probability of not having to alert
the diving operation due to MK 16 failures. MK 16 MCM system readiness over a
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Figure 4.1. MK 16 MCM System Mission Readiness
It must be emphasized that Figure 4.1 represents the mission readiness
applicable to the MK 16 MCM system, or the standard issue of four MK 16s
(including one spare MK 16). As can be seen from Figure 4.1, the measure of
mission readiness associated with a five-hour dive profile is 62%. This implies that
there is a 62% probability of having less than two failures for this scenario, or the
probability of not having to abort the dive. See Appendix E for further details on MK
16 MCM system mission readiness calculations.
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B. IMPROVING MISSION READINESS
The first method is to improve MK 16 MCM system mission readiness by
improving the reliability of the MK 16. The second method is to increase the number
of available spare MK 16s to the operational detachments. Both alternatives and their
applicable relationships with MK 16 MCM system readiness were analyzed and are
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Figure 4.3. Mission Readiness & Spares
to MK 16 MCM system readiness as a result of reliability improvements in the MK
16. For example, a 25% improvement in the reliability of the MK 16 would increase
MK 16MCM system mission readiness for a five-nour profile from 62% to 73%. See
Appendix F for further details on the MK 16 MCM mission readiness calculations.
Figure 4.3 depicts the improvements in MK 16 MCM system readiness as a
result of increasing the number of spares available to the operational detachment. For
example, the addition of a second spare MK 16 to the standard issue (totaling five MK
16s) would increase MK 16 MCM system readiness for a five-hour profile from 62%
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to 81%. See Appendix E for further details on the MK 16 MCM mission readiness
calculations.
C. COST OF THE ALTERNATIVES
1. Improving MK 16 Reliability
Actual cost data was unavailable. The actual cost function associated withMK
16 reliability improvements would most likely be exponential in nature, depicting
increasing costs at an increasing rate. The cost function illustrated in Figure 4.4 will
be used throughout this analysis to represent the theoretical cost of improving MK 16
reliability. It must be stressed that this information is intended to provide insight to
the resource manager on the cost benefit relationship.
The theoretical cost function that we developed for our analysis is expressed
as: Cost ofMK 16 Reliability Improvements = ( (% Improvement Desired) 3 12) X
$10. Table 4.1 illustrates the corresponding mean time between failures associated
with the percentage improvements in MK 16 reliability.
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Mean Time Between Failure
Figure 4.4. Reliability Improvement Cost Function
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As seen from Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1, the cost associated with reliability
improvements increases at an increasing rate. For example, to improve MK 16s
reliability from 20% to 30% would require an additional investment of $95,000,
improvement from 80% to 90% would require an additional investment of
$1,085,000. In both cases, there was a 10% increase in MK 16 reliability, but the
latter would require eleven times as much of an investment.
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2. Additional Spares
Table 4.2 illustrates the cost associated with providing additional spare MK
16s to each operational detachment.
Table 4.2. Cost of Additional Spares
MK 16s Issued Spare MK 16s Required
Procurement
Total Cost
4 (Std Issue) 1
5 2 20 $ 640,000
6 3 40 $ 1,280,000
7 4 60 $ 1,920,000
This information is based on an average cost of $32,000 per MK 16, and the existence of
twenty operational explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) mine countermeasure (MCM)
detachments.
D. COMBINING COST AND MISSION READINESS
By combining the readiness relationships with the cost data we can derive the
readiness improvement cost relationships associated with the two alternatives.
1. Readiness and the Cost of Improving Reliability
From Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1, we see that the values $40,000, $ 625,000, and
$2,560,000 represent the required investment for a 20%, 50%, and 80% improvement in MK
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Figure 4.6. MK 16 MCM System Readiness and Cost of Spares
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16 MCM system readiness. For example, a $625,000 investment would improve the
reliability of the MK 16 by 50%. Consequently, we see from Figure 4.5 that this investment
would improve MK16 MCM system readiness from 62.3% to 85.9%.
2. Readiness and the Cost of Additional Spares
The information provided in Table 4.2 is combined with the readiness spare
relationship and is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Adding an additional spare MK 16 to each
operational detachment would require an investment of $640,000. From Figure 4.6 we see
an increase in MK 16 MCM System readiness from 62% to 81%.
E. THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION DECISION
Any decision to improve mission readiness is subject to funding constraints. The
primary problem for the resource manager is determining where to invest these funds in an
effort to optimize mission readiness. By combining the two cost readiness relationships
previously identified, the resource manager is provided with beneficial insight as to which
alternative to select. Figure 4.7 illustrates the results of the cost alternative comparison. In
an effort to maximize mission readiness, investments of less than 1 .2 million dollars
should be invested in reliability improvements, while investments greater than 1 .2
million dollars should be invested in additional spare MK 16s. For example, if the
resource manager was given $640,000 to invest, improving MK 16 reliability would
improve readiness from 62% to 85.9%. Investments in additional spare MK 16s





Figure 4.7. Cost of Alternatives
F. FINAL COMMENTS
It must be reemphasized that this information is intended to provide insight to
the resource manager on the cost benefit relationship. There are many qualitative
factors and logistical requirements that could override the above recommendation.
For example, what is not taken into consideration in this model is the cost of the
additional requirements associated with these spare MK 16s. This research is based
solely on the limited data that was available, and is intended to identify the potential
benefits of developing a decision support model.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Resource managers and operational commanders within theMK 1 6 community
are faced with the dilemma of providing continued MK 16 support in an environment
where operational commitments continue to rise and budgets decline. The goal of this
thesis is to assist the resource manager in maximizing readiness by eliminating some
of the uncertainty associated with alternative resource allocation decisions. We
provided the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) resource manager with an
assessment of MK 16 reliability, operational availability, and developed a decision
support model to assist in the evaluation of potential alternatives.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The following are the conclusions of this research:
1. The MK 16 maintenance data collection program is inadequate. The
current failure analysis reporting (FAR) system used to report
unscheduled maintenance is administratively labor intensive (manual),
subjective and incapable of providing timely and accurate data. Until
this process is improved, all future analysis and efforts to improve MK
16 MCM system readiness will suffer.
2. MK 1 6 Mine Countermeasure (MCM) system mission readiness is low.
Our research shows that based on historical maintenance data, the
reliability of the MK 16 MOD UBA for the average five-hour profile
is 68%. Utilizing this reliability and the standard issue of fourMK 16s,
we calculated that the MK 16 MCM system mission readiness,
probably having less than two MK 16 failures, for a five-hour profile
is 62%.
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Decision support model reduces uncertainty and improves efficiency.
Our research demonstrates the advantages of using a decision support
model to evaluate potential alternatives for increasing mission readi-
ness. Without the use of a decision support model we would not have
been unable to assess the cost benefit relationships associated with the
two alternatives. The model provided specific evaluation criteria
necessary to select the optimal alternative.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are recommendations from this research:
1. Convert the MK 16 Failure Analysis Reporting (FAR) Program to
an Electronic Data Reporting System
The importance of accurate and timely data cannot be over emphasized. Data
analysis is the primary means by which we judge operational performance and
forecast logistical requirements. Converting the current reporting procedure to an
electronic procedure would not only improve the timeliness of the data, but it would
also improve accuracy and facilitate the availability of the data for future
research.
2. ImproveMK 16 Mem System Mission Readiness by Improving MK
16 MOD UBA Reliability
Based on the hypothetical cost function developed for MK 16 reliability
improvements, our research suggests that the most efficient investment to maximize
mission readiness is to invest sums less than 1.2 million dollars to improve MK 16
reliability, and invest sums greater than 1.2 million dollars in spare MK 16s. By
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applying accurate cost data to our model, the resource manager will acquire critical
insight on the cost benefit relationship.
3. Implement Decision Support Models to Improve the Efficiency of
Resource Allocations
The advantages of using decision support models in evaluating alternatives
cannot be over emphasized. Use of models similar to the model developed in this
thesis will reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with the allocation of limited
EOD resources.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Three areas identified during this research suggest additional analysis:
1. Analyze the Feasibility of Developing an Electronic MK 16
Maintenance Reporting Program
As previously mentioned, any form of analysis is only as good as the data used
to develop that analysis. Regardless of the analysis technique, if the data is a poor
representation of reality then the results of the analysis will have little to no value.
As the availability of timely and accurate data improves so will the confidence and
benefit of future analysis. The proposed system should include all diving related
equipment and conceivably be combined with the diving safety program reporting
system. This would not only simplify and improve the FAR reporting procedures, but
would also contribute to cutting cost by consolidating two separate systems into one.
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2. Analyze the Future Consequences of Not Replacing the MK 16
The fact that there is not a designated replacement for the MK 16 implies that
it will most likely be extended beyond its anticipated useful life. The importance of
predicting the consequences of this decision on future logistical requirements, and its
effects on future operational capability, is vital to the development of a sound
strategic support plan.
3. Analyze the Effects of a Formal Maintenance Training Program
Many of the maintenance requirements for the MK 16 are the result of
inexperienced maintenance technicians (i.e., pinched o-rings). It is proposed that a
study be conducted to analyze the effects that a formal maintenance training program
would have on the MK 16 reliability, operational availability and mission readiness.
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APPENDIX A. MK 16 COMPONENT FAILURES FROM 1987-1991
The primary source of information relating to system failure and corrective
maintenance requirements was taken from the current MK 16 failure analysis
reporting (FAR) system. This data was collected by the Navy Explosive Ordnance
Disposal Technical Division for a five-year period from 1987 to 1991.
Electronics Subassembly
Nomenclature 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
Primary Electronics 37 35 32 35 19 158
Oxygen Addition Valve 31 31 22 26 10 120
Secondary Display 27 29 24 15 20 115
Cables 18 16 10 8 30 82
Primary Display 4 13 4 4 2 27
Diluent Addition Valve 1 4 1 1 1 8
Primary Battery 2 1 3
Pneumatics Subassembly
Nomenclature 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
Diluent Regulator 36 34 20 24 20 134
Oxygen Gage 28 18 8 13 9 76
Diluent Gage 19 19 12 14 7 71
Oxygen Regulator 14 10 7 14 16 61
Oxygen Bypass 2 3 2 11 4 22
Diluent Bypass 2 3 13 3 21
Oxygen Bottle Valve 2 2
Diluent Bottle Valve 1 1
Recirculation Subassembly
Nomenclature 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
Center Section 46 29 45 25 7 152
Mouth Piece 14 5 4 2 25
Scrubber Assembly 5 4 3 6 4 22
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Diaphragm 3 9 1 13
|
Breathing Hoses 2 1 : i
Hardware Subassembly
Nomenclature 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total
Harness Assembly 5 1 1 1 8
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APPENDIX B. MK 16 SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS
The principal source of information relating to preventive maintenance
requirements was the NAVSEA SS600-AH-MMA-010 Maintenance Requirements
(April 1997).
Electronics Subassembly
MRC # Description Periodicity M/H Req MRC
B5LG98N Inspect & Test Primary Battery S-6R 0.1 None
B5LB66N Clean & Inspect Primary Battery
O-Ring
S-9R 0.8 None




MRC# Description Periodicity M/H Req MRC
B5JA50Y Clean & Inspect Manual Oxygen
Bypass Valve
S-1R 0.8 R-3&4
B5JA51Y Clean & Inspect Manual Diluent
Bypass Valve
S-2R 0.8 R-3&4
B5JA56Y Test Oxygen & Diluent
Regulators
A-1R 0.3 R-3&4




MRC# Description Periodicity M/H Req MRC
47JA52Y Clean & Inspect Center Section S-3R 1 R-3&4
B5JA54N Clean & Inspect Mouth Piece S-5R 0.5 None
Hardware Subassembly
MRC# Description Periodicity M/H Req MRC
None Required
Systems Requirements
MRC# Description. Periodicity M/H Req MRC
B5KY25 Test Accuracy of 02/Diluent
Pressure Gages
A-4R 0.5 None
47XXXN MK 1 6 Low-Mu Certification 60M-1R 1 None
47XXXN Pressure Vessels Low-Mu
Certification
60M-2R 1 None





MRC # Description Periodicity M'H Req MRC
B5JA59N Pre-Dive R-l 0.5 None
B5JA60N Post-Dive R-2 0.3 None
B5JA61N REC Documentation R-3 0.5 None
B5JA62N REC Procedures R-4 0.3 None
B5JA49N Clean Breathing Hose &
Mouthpiece
R-5 0.5 None
Verify Cylinder Pressure in Lay-
Up
R-6W 0.5 None
47XXXN Perform Oxvtien Cleaning R-7 None
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APPENDIX D. MK 16 SUBASSEMBLY & COMPONENT
RELIABILITIES
The following subassembly and component reliability calculations are based on the
average dive profile of ninety minutes. The reliability values listed below are the probability
of that component or subassembly not failing during the ninety minute dive profile.
Electrical Subassembly = .949
Nomenclature Total Failures MTBF; 1.5 hr Reliability
Primary Electronics 158 93.5 .9841
Oxygen Addition Valve 120 123.1 .9879
Secondary Display 115 128.5 .9884
Cables 82 180.2 .9917
Primary Display 27 547.2 .9973
Diluent Addition Valve 8 1846.6 .9992
Primary Battery 3 4925 .9997
Pneumatic Subassembly = .961
Nomenclature Total Failures MTBFi 1.5 hr Reliability
Diluent Regulator 134 110.3 .9865
Oxygen Gage 76 194.4 .9923
Diluent Gage 71 208.1 .9928
Oxygen Regulator 61 242.2 .9938
Oxygen bypass 22 671.6 .9978
Diluent Bypass 21 703.6 .9979
Oxygen Bottle Valve 2 7387.5 .9998
Diluent Bottle Valve 1 14775 .9999
Recirculation Subassembly = .978
Nomenclature Total Failures MTBF; 1.5hr Reliability
Center Section 152 97.2 .9847
Mouth Piece 25 591 .9975
Scrubber Assembly 22 671.6 .9978
Diaphragm 13 1136.5 .9987
Breathing Hoses 3 4925 .9997
49
Hardware Subassembly == .999
Nomenclature Total Failures MTBF, 1.5hr Reliability
Harness 8 1846.9 .9992
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APPENDIX E. MK 16 MCM SYSTEM MISSION READINESS AND
AVAILABLE SPARES
The measure ofMK 1 6 MCM system mission readiness proposed in this research is
expressed as the probability of mission success, or otherwise stated, it is the probability of
not having to abort the diving phase of the operation due to MK 1 6 failures. In accordance
with standard operating procedures for MK 16 deployment, the diving phase is aborted when
less than three MK 16s remain operational. Using the binomial distribution, the results are
shown in Table E-l
.
The appropriate dive profiles from column 1 were utilized in the MK 1 6 reliability
function to determine the reliability for that specific profile, which is column 2. The
reliability from column two was the utilized in a binomial distribution to determine the
probability of mission success for the appropriate number ofMK 16 spares, columns 3 thru
7.
An example ofa mission readiness calculation, if issued five MK 16s (two spare MK
1 6s), what is the probability of completing a five-hour diving operation? In this example
you can have up to two MK 16 failures and successfully complete the diving phase of the
operation, therefore the measure of mission readiness is the probability of having less than
or equal to two failures.
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Table E.l. MK 16 MCM System Mission Readiness
Issue of Five MK 16s (Two Spare MK 16s) for a Five-hour Profile
Failures Mathematical Expression Solution
Probability of Failures (.6839) 5 .1496
Probability of 1 Failure 5(.6839) 4 (l-.683°^ .3457
Probability of 2 Failures 10(.6839) 3 (l-.683 : .3196
Probability of Mission Su :ss , (less than or equal to two failures) .8149















0.5 .9627 .8923 .9921 .9995 1.000 1.000
1 .9268 .7961 .9709 .9965 .9996 1.000
2 .859 .6338 .9019 .9776 .9953 .9991
3 .7961 .5046 .8132 .9391 .9818 .9949
4 .7379 .4017 .7176 .8833 .9556 .9841
5 .6839 .3198 .6231 .8149 .9160 .9639
6 .6338 .2546 .5343 .7392 .8642 .9329
7 .5874 .2027 .4536 .6606 .8030 .8911
8 .5444 .1614 .3819 .5829 .7355 .8397
9 .5046 .1285 .3194 .5086 .6648 .7809
10 .4677 .1023 .2656 .4395 .5938 .7170
Columns:
1) Dive Profile (t): represents the length of the dive in hours.
2) Reliability R(t): application of the MK 16 reliability function for the corresponding dive profile.
3) Issuance of three MK 16 where there are no spare MK 16s.
4 ) Standard issue of four MK 16s where there is one spare MK 16.
5) Issuance of five MK 16s where there are two spare MK 16s.
6) Issuance of six MK 16s where there are three spare MK 16s.
7) Issuance of seven MK 16s where there are four spare MK 16s.
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APPENDIX F. MK 16 MCM SYSTEM MISSION READINESS
AND IMPROVEMENTS IN MK 16 RELIABILITY
The measure of MK 1 6 MCM system mission readiness proposed in this
research is expressed as the probability of not having to abort the diving phase of the
mine countermeasure operation due to MK 16 failures. In accordance with standard
operating procedures for MK 16 deployment, the diving phase is aborted when less
than three MK 16s remain operational. The following calculations are based on the
standard issue of four MK 1 6s where two are deployed on the primary divers, one
is worn by the standby diver, and the remaining MK 16s are staged as ready spares.












0.5 .9627 .9921 .9936 .9953 .9979
1 .9268 .9709 .9763 .9825 .9921
2 .859 .9019 .9186 .9385 .9709
3 .7961 .8132 .8425 .8783 .9400
4 .7379 .7176 .7581 .8093 .9019
5 .6839 .6231 .6724 .7366 .8591
6 .6338 .5343 .5896 .6639 .8132












8 .5444 .3819 .4417 .5272 .7176
9 .5046 .3194 .3784 .4655 .6699
10 .4677 .2656 .3225 .4091 .6231
Columns:
1) Dive Profile: represents the length of the dive in hours.
2) Reliability: application of the MK 16 reliability function for the corresponding dive profile.
3) Original Readiness: refers to the mission readiness associated with the current MK 16
reliability.
4 ) 10 % Improvement: refers to the mission readiness associated with a 10 % improvement in
MK 16 reliability.
5 ) 25 % Improvement: refers to the mission readiness associated with a 25 % improvement in
MK 16 reliability.
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